The Anglo-Scots Wars, 1513-1550: A Military History

The centrality of military activity to Anglo-Scots relations in the first half of the sixteenth century has, perhaps, been underestimated. Although there has been much recent interest in the formation of the multi-national Tudor State and the process of political union in the Atlantic Archipelago’, historians have had little to say about the role of war in this process or about how war was conducted. This book seeks to place Anglo-Scots conflict firmly in the context of European warfare, examining both the organisational nature of the two nations’ military establishments and providing a detailed operational study of military activity. By examining the manner in which both Scottish and English armies demonstrated a commitment to tactical and technological development it challenges notions that the British Isles were peripheral to the trends of mainstream continental warfare. The persistent failure of both nations to formulate or implement realistic strategies, tactical competence notwithstanding, is addressed, and the limitations imposed by poor logistical arrangements and by the inherent weaknesses of armies of levied civilians is emphasised to explain why, whilst both nations frequently resorted to war to further political aims, neither was able to achieve any lasting success. Individual campaigns are examined in some detail, including the major engagements at Flodden (1513), Solway Moss (1542), and Pinkie (1547); attention is also paid to the less exceptional routines of military activity, garrison duty, chevauchee, and siege work. The cessation of hostilities in 1550 marked the effective culmination of a centuries-long conflict between Scotland and England, and the final decades of war are thus an important watershed in Anglo-Scots relations.